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Abstract—Multishot network coding is considered in a worst-
case adversarial setting in which an omniscient adversary with
unbounded computational resources may inject erroneous pack-
ets in up to t links, erase up to ρ packets, and wire-tap up
to µ links, all throughout ℓ shots of a linearly-coded network.
Assuming no knowledge of the underlying linear network code (in
particular, the network topology and underlying linear code may
be random and change with time), a coding scheme achieving
zero-error communication and perfect secrecy is obtained based
on linearized Reed-Solomon codes. The scheme achieves the
maximum possible secret message size of ℓn′−2t−ρ−µ packets
for coherent communication, where n′ is the number of outgoing
links at the source, for any packet length m ≥ n′ (largest
possible range). By lifting this construction, coding schemes for
non-coherent communication are obtained with information rates
close to optimal for practical instances. The required field size
is qm, where q > ℓ, thus qm ≈ ℓn
′
, which is always smaller than
that of a Gabidulin code tailored for ℓ shots, which would be
at least 2ℓn
′
. A Welch-Berlekamp sum-rank decoding algorithm
for linearized Reed-Solomon codes is provided, having quadratic
complexity in the total length n = ℓn′, and which can be
adapted to handle not only errors, but also erasures, wire-
tap observations and non-coherent communication. Combined
with the obtained field size, the given decoding complexity is
of O(n′4ℓ2 log(ℓ)2) operations in F2, whereas the most efficient
known decoding algorithm for a Gabidulin code has a complexity
of O(n′3.69ℓ3.69 log(ℓ)2) operations in F2, assuming a multipli-
cation in a finite field F costs about log(|F|)2 operations in F2.
Index Terms—Linearized Reed-Solomon codes, multishot net-
work coding, network error-correction, sum-rank metric, sum-
subspace codes, wire-tap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
L INEAR network coding over a finite field Fq0 , introducedin [1]–[3], permits maximum information flow from a
source to several sinks simultaneously in one shot (multicast).
Moreover, for sufficiently large field size q0, the maximum
information flow can be achieved with high probability by a
random choice of coding coefficients at each node, without
knowledge of the network topology [4].
Correction of link errors was considered in [5]–[10], and
secrecy against link wire-tapping was studied in [11]–[15].
Some of these works assume probabilistic error correction,
and some require knowledge or modification of the linear
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network code for the outer code construction. Error-correcting
codes under an adversarial model without such requirements
(thus compatible with random linear network coding) were
first given in [16], [17] for non-coherent communication (in
which the sink has no knowledge of the coding coefficients of
the incoming links), and in [18] for coherent communication.
Coding schemes that provide perfect secrecy and zero-error
communication, without knowledge or modification of the
underlying linear network code, were first given in [19]. The
coherent-case construction in that work (similarly in [16]–
[18]) is based on Gabidulin codes [20], [21]. If the packets
sent through the links of the network in one shot are vectors
in Fmq0 , then coding schemes based on Gabidulin codes achieve
the maximum secret message size of n′ − 2t− ρ− µ packets,
where n′ is the number of outgoing links at the source, and for
t (link) errors, ρ erasures and µ wire-tapped links. Moreover,
the packet length m is only restricted to m ≥ n′, which is
the maximum possible range for m, where n′ is a constraint
given by the channel.
All of the works noted above make use of only one shot
of the linearly-coded network. Correction of link errors in
multishot network coding (see Fig. 1) was first investigated
in [24], [25]. As noted in these works, the ℓ-shot case can
be treated as a 1-shot case with number of outgoing links
at the source n = ℓn′. An ℓ-shot Gabidulin code, that is, a
Gabidulin code tailored for ℓn′ outgoing links at the source,
yields the maximum message size of ℓn′− 2t−ρ packets, but
would require packet lengthsm ≥ n = ℓn′ instead of m ≥ n′,
which may be impractically large. More importantly, decoding
an ℓ-shot Gabidulin code using [26] would require O(n2)
operations over a field of size qℓn
′
0 (even faster decoders [27],
[28] would be quite expensive for such field sizes, see Table I).
To circumvent these issues, the authors of [24], [25] provide
a multilevel construction that improves the error-correction
capability of trivial concatenations of 1-shot Gabidulin codes,
with lower decoding complexity than an ℓ-shot Gabidulin
code, although without achieving the maximum secret message
size.
Later, convolutional rank-metric codes were studied in
[29]–[33], and a concatenation of an outer Hamming-metric
convolutional code with an inner rank-metric block code was
given in [34]. See [35] for a survey. Convolutional techniques
yield codes achieving the streaming capacity for the burst rank
loss networks described in [32], where recovery of a given
packet is required before a certain delay. By truncating the
convolutional codes in [31], [32] up to their memory, one may
obtain block codes whose message size is close to the upper
bound ℓn′ − 2t − ρ, but their field sizes are in general still
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Fig. 1. A pattern of link errors in multishot linear network coding. Similarly for link observations by a wire-tapper. Dashed lines denote links directly affected
by the adversary, and dotted lines denote links that suffer the effect indirectly. The network code may change with time. In this example, a rank deficiency
results in an erasure for the first sink in the second shot. Although not depicted here, the network topology may also change with time. If the linear network
code is defined over Fq0 = F2, linearized Reed-Solomon codes in this case are defined over Fqn′ = Fq2 , 2|q, and allow us to use ℓ < q shots of the
network, thus |Fq2 | ≈ ℓ
2, which is quadratic in ℓ. Observe that Gabidulin codes would require the field F
22ℓ
, which is exponential in ℓ.
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Fig. 2. Reliable and secure multishot linear network coding naturally extends reliable and secure multicast discrete memoryless channels. In this figure, the
latter is depicted. Network coding is not necessary, which means that we may take the network base field Fq0 = F2. Since n
′ = 1, linearized Reed-Solomon
codes coincide in this case with classical and generalized Reed-Solomon codes [22], [23], which are defined over Fq and allow us to use ℓ < q shots, thus
|Fq| ≈ ℓ, which is linear in ℓ. In this case, Gabidulin codes would require the field F2ℓ , which is again exponential in ℓ .
exponential in n′ and ℓ.
To the best of our knowledge, schemes that achieve zero-
error communication and perfect secrecy without knowledge
of the underlying network code as in [19] have not yet been
investigated in the multishot case.
In this work, we provide such a family of coding schemes
for coherent communication with maximum secret message
size of ℓn′ − 2t− ρ− µ packets, whose packet length is only
restricted to m ≥ n′ (maximum possible range) in contrast to
m ≥ ℓn′. The original base field of the network is embedded
Fq0 ⊆ Fq in a field of size q = q
s
0, for suitable s satisfying
q > ℓ, and the obtained coding schemes are defined over the
field Fqm , whose size is approximately max{ℓ, q0}n
′
, and in
most real scenarios (ℓ > q0), it is ℓ
n′ . We do not know if the
range of values q > ℓ, for q given ℓ, is maximum, but we
conjecture that q must be Ω(ℓ) (equivalently, ℓ = O(q)) as
is the case for MDS codes (the case n′ = 1). By lifting our
construction, we adapt it to non-coherent communication with
nearly optimal information rates for practical instances.
Our coding schemes are based on linearized Reed-Solomon
codes, introduced in [36] and closely connected to skew
Reed-Solomon codes [37]. Linearized Reed-Solomon codes
are maximum sum-rank distance (MSRD) codes, which is
precisely the property that gives the optimality of our coding
schemes. We provide a Welch-Berlekamp sum-rank decoding
algorithm for these codes that requires O(n2) operations over
the field of size qm ≈ ℓn
′
. Hence we obtain a reduction in
the decoding complexity in operations over F2 of more than
a degree in the number of shots compared to the existing
decoding algorithms and codes. See Table I. We remark that
our algorithm is related to a skew-metric decoding algorithm
for skew Reed-Solomon codes recently given in [38]. As
we will see, such an algorithm can be translated to a sum-
rank decoding algorithm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes,
although this is not done in [38]. In addition, the algorithm
in [38] has cubic complexity over the field of size qm ≈ ℓn
′
and does not handle erasures, wire-tap observations and non-
coherent communication, in contrast to our algorithm.
Linearized Reed-Solomon codes are natural hybrids be-
tween Reed-Solomon codes [22], [23] and Gabidulin codes
[20], [21], [39], in the same way that the sum-rank metric is a
hybrid between the Hamming and rank metrics, and adversar-
ial multishot network coding is a hybrid between adversarial
network coding and adversarial discrete memoryless channels
(e.g., wire-tap channel of type II [40] or secret sharing [41]).
See and compare Figs. 1 and 2. Furthermore, our Welch-
Berlekamp decoding algorithm includes the classical one [42]
and its rank-metric version [26] as particular cases. What
happens is that rank-metric and Hamming-metric codes are
two extremal particular cases of sum-rank-metric codes that
correspond to ℓ = 1 and n′ = 1, respectively. With this point
of view, the use of linearized Reed-Solomon codes instead of
Gabidulin codes as MSRD codes extends the idea of using
Reed-Solomon codes rather than Gabidulin codes as MDS
codes (see Figs. 1 and 2): in both cases, information rates are
equal but Gabidulin codes require a field size exponentiated
to the ℓth power, thus providing no advantage unless ℓ = 1
(the rank-metric case). See Table II in Subsection V-A for
a summarized classification of Reed-Solomon-like evaluation
codes with maximum distance for certain metrics.
We conclude by giving two other interpretations of reliable
and secure ℓ-shot network coding. First, ℓ-shot network coding
3can be thought of as 1-shot network coding where we have
knowledge of at least ℓ connected components in the under-
lying graph after removing the source and sinks. Observe that
here we may have a different number ni of outgoing links in
each component. If each connected component has a single
outgoing link, we recover the (multicast) discrete memoryless
channel (see Fig. 2). Second, we may view ℓ-shot network
coding as 1-shot network coding where packets are divided
into ℓ sub-packets. In this scenario, errors, erasures and wire-
tapper observations occur in certain sub-packets (rather than
over whole packets) in certain links. If the sub-packets are
considered as symbols, this gives another interpretation of
multishot network coding as hybrid between network coding
and a discrete memoryless channel. The work [43] treats
a similar hybrid of symbol and link errors, although they
consider that if a symbol error occurs in one link, it occurs
in all links (i.e., all transmitted subspaces). This may make
error-correction impossible if the adversary spreads the errors
in pessimistic patterns.
Summary and Significance of our Main Contributions
Our coding schemes achieve the maximum secret message
size of n′ℓ− 2t− ρ− µ packets for coherent communication
(Theorem 6) and nearly optimal information rates for non-
coherent communication (Theorem 8), as stated above, and
satisfy the following:
1) Their field size is qm, where q > ℓ, q = qs0 for some
s ∈ N, and m ≥ n′. Thus their field size is approximately
max{ℓ, q0}
n′ , (1)
whereas an ℓ-shot Gabidulin code always requires the field
size qℓn
′
0 , which is always considerably larger, since: a)
ℓn
′
≪ (qℓ0)
n′ , if q0 < ℓ, and b) q
n′
0 ≪ (q
n′
0 )
ℓ, if q0 ≥ ℓ.
Notice, moreover, that ℓn
′
is polynomial in ℓ, whereas qℓn
′
0
is exponential in ℓ. See also Figs. 1 and 2 for instances with
n′ = 2 and n′ = 1, respectively, and q0 = 2.
TABLE I
DECODING COMPLEXITY IN NO. OF OPERATIONS OVER F2
Algorithm Code Complexity
Subsec. V-C Linearized RS [36] O(n′4ℓ2 log(ℓ)2)
[38] Skew RS [37] O(n′5ℓ3 log(ℓ)2)
[27] Gabidulin [20] O(n′3.69ℓ3.69 log(ℓ)2)
[26] Gabidulin [20] O(n′4ℓ4)
2) We provide a decoding algorithm with complexity of
O(n2) operations over Fqm (recall that n = ℓn′). Assuming
that one multiplication in a finite field F of characteristic 2
costs about log(|F|)2 operations in F2, our decoding algorithm
has complexity of
O(n′4ℓ2 log(ℓ)2) (2)
operations over F2, as a function of ℓ and n′. Observe also
that in most practical situations, ℓ ≫ n′ and n′ is a constant
of the channel. Table I shows a comparison between this
complexity and those of other algorithms in the literature,
for coding schemes that are optimal in the coherent case or
near optimal in the noncoherent case. We always assume that
a multiplication in F costs log(|F|)2 operations in F2. Note
that, setting n′ = 1, linearized Reed-Solomon codes become
classical Reed-Solomon codes, and the obtained complexity in
(2) is of O(ℓ2 log(ℓ)2) operations in F2, which is that of the
quadratic-complexity Welch-Berlekamp decoding algorithm.
3) By multiplying the message vector by a generator ma-
trix, our coding scheme has encoding complexity of O(kn)
operations over Fqm . Since encoding with a linear code has in
general complexity of O(kn) operations over the correspond-
ing field, we obtain reductions in encoding complexity similar
to those shown in Table I, in operations over F2.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formulate zero-error communication and perfect
secrecy in adversarial multishot network coding. This is a
natural extension of the formulation in [19] to the multishot
case. In Section III, we give sufficient and necessary conditions
for coding schemes to correct a given number of errors and
erasures, and for perfect secrecy under a given number of wire-
tapped links. This again is a natural extension of [18], [19],
and the sufficient condition for error correction was already
given in [25]. In Section IV, we provide the above-mentioned
constructions based on the linearized Reed-Solomon codes
introduced in [36]. We then give Singleton-type bounds, and
prove that our schemes attain them for coherent communica-
tion and are close to them in the non-coherent case. Finally,
we give in Section V a Welch-Berlekamp sum-rank decoding
algorithm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes.
Notation and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we will fix a prime power q and
positive integers m, ℓ, n = n1 + n2 + · · · + nℓ, and N =
N1+N2+ · · ·+Nℓ. The number m corresponds to the packet
length in each shot, ℓ is the number of shots, and ni and Ni
are the number of outgoing links at the source and incoming
links to the sink, respectively, in the ith shot.
We will denote by Fq the finite field with q elements. For
a field F, we will denote by Fm×n the set of m× n matrices
with entries in F, and we denote Fn = F1×n. The field over
which we consider linearity, ranks, and dimensions will be
clear from the context. We will implicitly consider “erased”
matrices, which may be denoted by ∗. We will define Fm×0 =
{∗} and F0×n = {∗}. Operations with matrices are assumed to
be extended to ∗ in the obvious way. For instance, Rk(∗) = 0,
A∗ = ∗ for A ∈ Fn×m, etc.
For matrices Ai ∈ FNi×ni , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we define
the block-diagonal matrix
diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ) =

A1 0 . . . 0
0 A2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Aℓ
 ∈ FN×n.
To define diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ), for each i such that Ai = ∗ ∈
F0×ni , we only add ni zero columns between the (i − 1)th
4and the (i + 1)th blocks. For example, if A ∈ FN1×n1 ,
∗ ∈ F0×n2 and B ∈ FN3×n3 , we define diag(A, ∗, B) ∈
F(N1+N3)×(n1+n2+n3) as putting n2 zero columns between
the first n1 and the last n3 columns in diag(A,B) ∈
F(N1+N3)×(n1+n3).
Fix an ordered basisA = {α1, α2, . . . , αm} of Fqm over Fq.
For any non-negative integer s, we denote by MA : Fsqm −→
Fm×sq the corresponding matrix representation map, given by
MA (c) =

c11 c12 . . . c1s
c21 c22 . . . c2s
...
...
. . .
...
cm1 cm2 . . . cms
 , (3)
for c = (c1, c2, . . . , cs) ∈ Fsqm , where ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,m ∈ Fq
are the unique scalars such that ci =
∑m
j=1 αjci,j ∈ Fqm , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Given X ∈ Fm×nq , we denote by Row(X) ⊆ F
n
q and
Col(X) ⊆ Fmq the vector spaces generated by the rows and
the columns of X , respectively. For c ∈ Fnqm , we denote
Row(c) = Row(MA(c)) ⊆ Fnq and Col(c) = Col(MA(c)) ⊆
Fmq . The latter depends on A, but we omit this for simplicity.
Throughout the paper, we will use the short notation
(xi)
ℓ
i=1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ) for tuples, where x1, x2, . . . , xℓ
could be any type of element (integers, elements of finite
fields, sets, subspaces...).
II. RELIABILITY AND SECURITY IN ADVERSARIAL
MULTISHOT NETWORK CODING
In this section, we will formulate reliability and security
in multishot network coding under a worst-case adversarial
model. Our analysis naturally extends that in [19] to the
multishot case (see also [16]–[18]).
We will consider ℓ shots of a network where linear network
coding over the finite field Fq is implemented [1]–[3], where
we have no knowledge of or control over the network topology
or the encoding coefficients (thus random linear network
coding [4] may be implemented). The network topology may
change with time, the encoding coefficients at each node are
independent for different shots, and we assume no delays. The
packets sent in each shot through the links of the network and
linearly combined at each node are vectors in Fmq . We assume
that an adversary is able to inject error packets in up to t links,
modify transfer matrices to erase up to ρ encoded packets, and
wire-tap up to µ links, all distributed over the ℓ shots of the
network as the adversary wishes (see Fig. 1). Other than these
restrictions, the adversary is assumed to be omniscient (he or
she knows the coding scheme used at the source, the network
topology and all encoding coefficients in the network) and
have unlimited computational power.
Fix i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Assume that the ith shot has as input a
matrix Xi ∈ Fm×niq . Define ti ≥ 0 and ρi ≥ 0 as the number
of link errors and erasures, respectively, that the adversary
introduces, and µi ≥ 0 as the number of links that the
adversary wire-taps, all in the ith shot. These numbers are
thus arbitrary with sums t, ρ and µ, respectively, and only
these sums are known or estimated by the source or sinks.
Following the model in [19, Sec. III], the output to the receiver
is a matrix
Yi = XiA
T
i + Ei ∈ F
m×Ni
q ,
for a transfer matrix Ai ∈ FNi×niq with Rk(Ai) ≥ ni − ρi,
and for an error matrix Ei ∈ Fm×Niq with Rk(Ei) ≤ ti,
where equalities can be achieved. The transfer matrix Ai may
be known by the receiver (coherent communication) or not
(non-coherent communication). The non-coherent case is more
realistic if random linear network coding is applied. However,
we include both since, as we will see, optimal solutions for the
coherent case, which is simpler to solve, will give near optimal
solutions for the non-coherent case. Following the same model,
the adversary obtains the matrix
Wi = XiB
T
i ∈ F
m×µi
q ,
for a wire-tap transfer matrix Bi ∈ Fµi×niq .
Define now the set of input codewords, the set of output
words to the receiver, and the set of output messages to the
wire-tapper, respectively, as follows:
X = Fm×n1q × F
m×n2
q × · · · × F
m×nℓ
q ,
Y = Fm×N1q × F
m×N2
q × · · · × F
m×Nℓ
q ,
W =
⋃
0≤µi≤ni
1≤i≤ℓ
Fm×µ1q × F
m×µ2
q × · · · × F
m×µℓ
q .
Assume that the sent codeword is X ∈ X . With the previous
restrictions on the adversary, in the case of coherent communi-
cation with transfer matrices Ai ∈ FNi×niq , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ,
such that
ℓ∑
i=1
Rk(Ai) ≥ n− ρ,
the output of the ℓ-shot network is restricted to the subset
YA1,A2,...,AℓX (t) = {Y ∈ Y | Yi = XiA
T
i + Ei,
Ei ∈ Fm×Niq ,
ℓ∑
i=1
Rk(Ei) ≤ t}.
In the case of non-coherent communication, the output is
instead restricted to the subset
YX(t, ρ) = {Y ∈ Y | Yi = XiA
T
i + Ei,
Ai ∈ FNi×niq ,
ℓ∑
i=1
Rk(Ai) ≥ n− ρ,
Ei ∈ Fm×Niq ,
ℓ∑
i=1
Rk(Ei) ≤ t}.
Finally, the output to the adversary is restricted to the subset
WX(µ) = {W ∈ W |Wi = XiB
T
i ,
Bi ∈ Fµi×niq ,
ℓ∑
i=1
µi = µ}.
Remark 1. Observe that by the matrix representation map
(3), we may consider X = Fnqm and Y = F
N
qm , which are
vector spaces over Fqm . We may also consider W = F
µ
qm ,
5but the union symbol above expresses the fact that we do not
know how many links the wire-tapper observes in each shot.
In this work, we will consider coding schemes as follows.
Definition 1 (Coding schemes). Let S be the set of secret
messages and let S ∈ S be a random variable in S. A coding
scheme is a randomized function F : S −→ X . For unique
decoding, we assume that XS ∩ XT = ∅ if S, T ∈ S and
S 6= T , where
XS = {X ∈ X | P (X | S) > 0},
for S ∈ S. We define the support scheme of F as the collection
of disjoint sets Supp(F ) = {XS}S∈S .
As in [19], we will require zero-error communication and
perfect secrecy. We can adapt the definition of universal
reliable and secure coding schemes from [19] to multishot
network coding as follows.
Definition 2. With notation as in the previous definition and
for integers t ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0, we say that a coding
scheme F : S −→ X is
1) t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent commu-
nication if for all transfer matrices Ai ∈ FNi×niq , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, with
∑ℓ
i=1 Rk(Ai) ≥ n−ρ, there exists
a decoding function D : Y −→ S, which may depend
on A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ, such that
D(Y ) = S,
for all Y ∈
⋃
X∈XS
YA1,A2,...,AℓX (t) and all S ∈ S.
2) t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for non-coherent com-
munication if there exists a decoding functionD : Y −→
S such that
D(Y ) = S,
for all Y ∈
⋃
X∈XS
YX(t, ρ) and all S ∈ S.
3) Secure under µ observations if it holds that
H(S | W ) = H(S),
or equivalently I(S;W ) = 0, for all W ∈⋃
X∈XS
WX(µ) and all S ∈ S.
We conclude by recalling how to construct coding schemes
using nested linear code pairs. The idea goes back to [40] for
the wire-tap channel of type II.
Definition 3 (Nested coset coding schemes). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm and S = F
k
qm , where
k = dim(C1) − dim(C2), we define its corresponding coding
scheme F : S −→ X as follows. Choose a vector space V
such that C1 = C2 ⊕ V , where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of
vector spaces, and a vector space isomorphism ψ : Fkqm −→ V .
Then we define F as any randomized function such that
XS = ψ(S) + C2, for S ∈ Fkqm .
Observe that C2 = {0} corresponds to using a single linear
code and a linear deterministic coding scheme. This is suitable
for reliability but not for security. The other extreme case,
C1 = Fnqm , is suitable for security but not for reliability.
III. MEASURES OF RELIABILITY AND SECURITY
In this section, we will extend the studies in [18], [19]
regarding what parameter of a coding scheme gives a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for it to be t-error and ρ-
erasure-correcting, or secure under µ observations. In Subsec-
tion III-A, we study error and erasure correction for coherent
communication. In Subsection III-B, we study error and era-
sure correction for non-coherent communication. Finally, in
Subsection III-C, we study security resistance against a wire-
tapper. Since the proofs are natural extensions of those in [18],
[19], we have moved them to the appendix.
A. The Sum-rank Metric and Coherent Communication
We start by defining the sum-rank metric in Fnqm , which
was introduced in [25]. It was implicitly considered earlier in
the space-time coding literature (see [44, Sec. III]).
Definition 4 (Sum-rank metric [25]). Let c = (c(1), c(2),
. . . , c(ℓ)) ∈ Fnqm , where c
(i) ∈ Fniqm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. We
define the sum-rank weight of c as
wtSR(c) =
ℓ∑
i=1
Rk(MA(c
(i))),
where MA is as in (3), taking s = ni for c
(i). Finally, we
define the sum-rank metric dSR : (Fnqm)
2 −→ N as
dSR(c,d) = wtSR(c− d),
for all c,d ∈ Fnqm .
Observe that indeed the sum-rank metric is a metric, and in
particular, it satisfies the triangle inequality. Observe also that
sum-rank weights and metrics depend on the decomposition
n = n1+n2+ · · ·+nℓ and the subfield Fq ⊆ Fqm . However,
we do not write this dependency for brevity.
Next we define minimum sum-rank distances of supports of
coding schemes.
Definition 5 (Minimum sum-rank distance). Given a coding
scheme F : S −→ X , we define its minimum sum-rank
distance as that of its support scheme (see Definition 1):
dSR(Supp(F )) = min{dSR(c,d) | c ∈ XS ,d ∈ XT , S 6= T }.
When F is constructed from nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fnqm , its minimum sum-rank distance is the relative minimum
sum-rank distance of the codes:
dSR(C1, C2) = min{wtSR(c) | c ∈ C1 \ C2}.
The minimum sum-rank distance of a single linear code C ⊆
Fnqm is dSR(C) = dSR(C, {0}).
We now give a sufficient and necessary condition for coding
schemes to be t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent
communication, for any non-negative integers t and ρ. The
sufficient part has already been proven in [25, Th. 1] for a
deterministic code. We will make use of both implications in
the proof of Theorem 5.
6Theorem 1. Given integers t ≥ 0 and ρ ≥ 0, a coding scheme
F : S −→ X is t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent
communication if, and only if,
2t+ ρ < dSR(Supp(F )).
Proof. See Appendix A.
B. The Sum-injection and Sum-subspace Distances and Non-
coherent Communication
Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nℓ). We will consider the Cartesian
product lattice
P(Fnq ) = P(F
n1
q )× P(F
n2
q )× · · · × P(F
nℓ
q ),
where P(Fniq ) is the lattice of vector subspaces of F
ni
q (that
is, the collection of all vector subspaces of Fniq considered
with sums and intersections of vector subspaces as oper-
ations), for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. We also denote P(Fmq )
ℓ for
n = (m,m, . . . ,m), of length ℓ. These Cartesian products
were first considered for multishot network coding in [24,
Subsec. II-B].
As in the single shot case [16], the actual information
preserved in a non-coherent multishot linear coded network
is the list of column spaces of the transmitted matrices. We
may justify this by extending the argument in [18, Subsec. V-
A]. We start by connecting codewords in Fnqm to elements in
the lattice P(Fmq )
ℓ.
Definition 6. Given c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(ℓ)) ∈ Fnqm , where
c(i) ∈ Fniqm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we define
ColΣ(c) = (Col(c
(i)))ℓi=1 ∈ P(F
m
q )
ℓ.
For a coding scheme F : S −→ X , we define its sum-subspace
support scheme as ColΣ(Supp(F )) = {ColΣ(XS)}S∈S ,
where
ColΣ(XS) = {ColΣ(c) | c ∈ XS}.
The error and erasure-correction capability of coding
schemes will be measured by an extension of the injection
distance [18, Def. 2] to the multishot scenario.
Definition 7 (Sum-injection distance). Given U = (U1, U2,
. . . ,Uℓ), V = (V1,V2, . . . ,Vℓ) ∈ P(Fmq )
ℓ, we define their
sum-injection distance as
dSI(U ,V) =
ℓ∑
i=1
dI(Ui,Vi)
=
ℓ∑
i=1
(dim(Ui + Vi)−min{dim(Ui), dim(Vi)})
=
ℓ∑
i=1
(max{dim(Ui), dim(Vi)} − dim(Ui ∩ Vi)).
For a coding scheme F : S −→ X , we define its minimum
sum-injection distance as
dSI(ColΣ(Supp(F ))) = min{dSI(ColΣ(c),ColΣ(d))
| c ∈ XS ,d ∈ XT , S 6= T }.
The following result extends [18, Th. 20] to the multishot
scenario.
Theorem 2. Given integers t ≥ 0 and ρ ≥ 0, a coding scheme
F : S −→ X is t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for non-
coherent communication if, and only if,
2t+ ρ < dSI(ColΣ(Supp(F ))).
In particular, it must hold that ColΣ(c) 6= ColΣ(d) if c ∈ XS ,
d ∈ XT and S 6= T .
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in the single shot case [16], the number of packets
injected in the ith shot by a codeword c, with ColΣ(c) =
U ∈ P(Fmq )
ℓ, coincides with dim(Ui). If all codewords inject
the same number of packets in a given shot, we may say that
the coding scheme is sum-constant-dimension. For such coding
schemes, the sum-injection distance coincides with the sum-
subspace distance introduced in [24, Eq. (2)].
Definition 8 (Sum-subspace distance [24]). Given U , V ∈
P(Fmq )
ℓ, we define their sum-subspace distance as
dSS(U ,V) =
ℓ∑
i=1
dS(Ui,Vi)
=
ℓ∑
i=1
(dim(Ui + Vi)− dim(Ui ∩ Vi)).
For a coding scheme F : S −→ X , we define its minimum
sum-subspace distance, denoted by dSS(ColΣ(Supp(F ))),
analogously to their minimum sum-injection distance (Defi-
nition 7).
Observe that by [18, Eq. (28)], it holds that
dSI(U ,V) =
1
2
dSS(U ,V) +
1
2
ℓ∑
i=1
| dim(Ui)− dim(Vi)|,
(4)
for all U , V ∈ P(Fmq )
ℓ. Hence as explained earlier, for
sum-constant-dimension codes we may simply consider its
minimum sum-subspace distance. Then the sufficient part in
Theorem 2 was already proven in [25, Th. 1].
C. Measuring Security Resistance Against a Wire-tapper
In this subsection, we give a sufficient and necessary
condition for coding schemes built from nested linear code
pairs to be secure under a given number of observations. We
start by estimating the information leakage to the wire-tapper.
This is a natural extension of [19, Lemma 6]. We will however
follow the steps in the proof of [45, Prop. 16] (see also [46,
Lemma 7]).
Lemma 1. Let F : S −→ X be a coding scheme built from
nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm as in Definition 3. Assume
that X = F (S) is the uniform random variable in XS given
S ∈ S. Let Bi ∈ Fµi×niq and Li = Row(Bi) ⊆ F
ni
q , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, define B = diag(B1, B2, . . . , Bℓ) ∈ Fµ×nq ,
L = (L1,L2, . . . ,Lℓ) ∈ P(Fnq ) and
VL = {c ∈ Fnqm | Row(c
(i)) ⊆ Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ}.
7Taking logarithms with base qm in entropy and mutual infor-
mation, it holds that
I(S;XBT ) ≤ dim(C⊥2 ∩ VL)− dim(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL), (5)
and equality holds if S is the uniform random variable in S.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus we may conclude the following.
Theorem 3. Let F : S −→ X be a coding scheme built
from nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm as in Definition 3.
Assume that F (S) is the uniform random variable in XS given
S ∈ S. Given an integer µ ≥ 0, the coset coding scheme is
secure under µ observations if
µ < dSR(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ).
The reversed implication also holds if S is the uniform random
variable in S.
Proof. This follows by combining the previous lemma with
the straightforward fact that µ < dSR(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) if, and only
if, C⊥2 ∩ VL = C
⊥
1 ∩ VL for all L ∈ P(F
n
q ) such that∑ℓ
i=1 dim(Li) ≤ µ.
IV. CODING SCHEMES BASED ON LINEARIZED
REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section, we will introduce a family of coding schemes
whose secret message entropy is the maximum possible for
coherent communication, for any fixed bound on the number
of errors, erasures and wire-tapped links, with the restrictions
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ ni ≤ m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. In
particular, n ≤ (q − 1)m. Assuming the secret message is a
uniform variable, these coding schemes have maximum secret
message size for the largest possible range of packet lengths.
By a process analogous to lifting [17, Subsec. IV-A], we will
also provide coding schemes with nearly optimal information
rate for non-coherent communication, for the same parameters,
among sum-constant-dimension codes.
The building blocks of these coding schemes are linearized
Reed-Solomon codes, introduced in [36, Def. 31]. We review
these codes in Subsection IV-A, and we compute their duals.
We then give upper bounds on the message entropy or size and
show that the above-mentioned coding schemes attain them in
the coherent case (Subsection IV-B), and are close in the non-
coherent case (Subsection IV-C).
A. Linearized Reed-Solomon Codes and their Duals
Throughout this subsection, we assume that 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ q − 1
and 1 ≤ ni ≤ m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Therefore n ≤ (q− 1)m.
Let σ : Fqm −→ Fqm be the field automorphism given
by σ(a) = aq
r
, for all a ∈ Fqm , where 1 ≤ r ≤ m and
gcd(r,m) = 1 (i.e., {a ∈ Fqm | σ(a) = a} = Fq). We may set
for simplicity r = 1, but we need to consider the general case
later to include dual codes. We need to define linear operators
as in [36, Def. 20]. Over finite fields (our case), polynomials
in these operators can be regarded as linearized polynomials
[47, Ch. 3].
Definition 9 (Linear operators [36]). Fix a ∈ Fqm , and
define its ith norm as Ni(a) = σ
i−1(a) · · ·σ(a)a. Now define
the Fq-linear operator Dia : Fqm −→ Fqm by
Dia(b) = σ
i(b)Ni(a), (6)
for all b ∈ Fqm , and all i ∈ N. Define also Da = D1a and
observe that Di+1a = Da ◦ D
i
a, for i ∈ N. We will write N
σ
i
and Dσa when it is not clear which automorphism σ we are
using.
We also need the concept of conjugacy in Fqm , which was
given in [48] (see also [49, Eq. (2.5)]).
Definition 10 (Conjugacy [48]). Given a, b ∈ Fqm , we say
that they are conjugates if there exists c ∈ F∗qm such that
b = σ(c)c−1a.
This defines an equivalence relation on Fqm , and thus a par-
tition of Fqm into conjugacy classes. Take now a primitive el-
ement γ of Fqm , meaning that F∗qm = {γ
0, γ1, γ2 . . . , γq
m−2}
(see [50, page 97]), and observe that
γj 6= σ(c)c−1γi,
for all c ∈ F∗qm and all 0 ≤ i < j ≤ q − 2. Hence
γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . , γq−2 constitute representatives of disjoint
conjugacy classes. Moreover, one can easily see that they
represent all conjugacy classes except the trivial one {0}. Thus
the following definition is a particular case of [36, Def. 31].
Definition 11 (Linearized Reed-Solomon codes [36]). Fix
linearly independent sets B(i) = {β
(i)
1 , β
(i)
2 , . . . , β
(i)
ni } ⊆ Fqm
over Fq, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and denote B = (B(1), B(2), . . . ,
B(ℓ)). Here, we emphasize that the elements in B(i) are linearly
independent, but there may be linear dependencies between
elements in B(i) and elements in
⋃
j 6=i B
(j). In particular, it
is possible to take B(1) = B(2) = . . . = B(ℓ). Let γ be a
primitive element of Fqm . For k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, we define
the linearized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k as the linear
code CσL,k(B, γ) ⊆ F
n
qm with generator matrix given by
D = (D1|D2| . . . |Dℓ) ∈ Fk×nqm , (7)
where
Di =

β
(i)
1 β
(i)
2 . . . β
(i)
ni
Dγi−1
(
β
(i)
1
)
Dγi−1
(
β
(i)
2
)
. . . Dγi−1
(
β
(i)
ni
)
D2
γi−1
(
β
(i)
1
)
D2
γi−1
(
β
(i)
2
)
. . . D2
γi−1
(
β
(i)
ni
)
...
...
. . .
...
Dk−1
γi−1
(
β
(i)
1
)
Dk−1
γi−1
(
β
(i)
2
)
. . . Dk−1
γi−1
(
β
(i)
ni
)

for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
By [36, Prop. 33] (see also Subsection V-A), this code
is isomorphic as a vector space to a k-dimensional skew
Reed-Solomon code [37, Def. 7]. In particular, it is also k-
dimensional and the generator matrix in (7) has full rank.
Moreover, linearized Reed-Solomon codes are maximum sum-
rank distance codes, which was proven in [36]. The next result
combines [36, Prop. 34] and [36, Th. 4].
8Proposition 1 ([36]). For a linear code C ⊆ Fnqm of dimension
k, it holds that
dSR(C) ≤ n− k + 1.
Moreover, equality holds for C = CσL,k(B, γ) as in Defini-
tion 11. That is, linearized Reed-Solomon codes are maximum
sum-rank distance (MSRD) codes.
Observe that Gabidulin codes [20], [21] and their extension
[39] are obtained as particular cases by choosing ℓ = 1 (thus
n = n1): In that case, we have that Nj(γ
0) = Nj(1) = 1,
hence
Dj
γ0
(β
(1)
i ) = σ
j(β
(1)
i ),
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
One can also recover Reed-Solomon codes [22] and gener-
alized Reed-Solomon codes [23] by setting σ = Id or m = 1
(thus n1 = n2 = . . . = nℓ = 1): In that case, we have that
Nj(γ
i−1) = (γi−1)j and σ(β
(i)
1 ) = β
(i)
1 , hence
Dj
γi−1
(β
(i)
1 ) = β
(i)
1 (γ
i−1)j ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ and j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. This explains the
discussion in Section I.
Intuitively, the conjugacy representative γi−1 and the linear
operator Dγi−1 are used in the ith shot of the network as
a Gabidulin code, whereas using different conjugacy classes
allows to correct link errors globally, seeing the code block-
wise as a Reed-Solomon code (observe the correspondence
between Fig. 1 and the generator matrix (7)). See also Table
II in Subsection V-A for a summary of maximum-distance
evaluation codes of Reed-Solomon type for different metrics.
We now prove that the duals of these codes are again
linearized Reed-Solomon codes, thus also maximum sum-rank
distance, which was not proven in [36]. This result extends [23,
Th. 1], [20, Th. 7] and [39, Th. 2]. We will need it to obtain
optimal secure coding schemes in view of Theorem 3. It also
has the advantage of providing explicit parity-check matrices
for linearized Reed-Solomon codes in the form of (7).
Theorem 4. For k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, if CσL,k(B, γ) is as in
Definition 11, then there exist linearly independent sets A(i) =
{α
(i)
1 , α
(i)
2 , . . . , α
(i)
ni } ⊆ Fqm over Fq , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, such
that
CσL,k(B, γ)
⊥ = Cσ
−1
L,n−k(A, σ
−1(γ)),
where A = (A(1),A(2), . . . ,A(ℓ)), and where σ−1(γ) is a
primitive element of Fqm . In particular, CσL,k(B, γ)
⊥ is also
an MSRD code.
Proof. First CσL,n−1(B, γ)
⊥ is generated by one vector α =
(α(1),α(2), . . . ,α(ℓ)) ∈ Fnqm , where α
(i) ∈ Fniqm , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Assume that there exists i such that
α
(i)
1 , α
(i)
2 , . . . , α
(i)
ni are linearly dependent over Fq . Then there
exists a non-zero λ ∈ Fnq with sum-rank weight equal to 1,
such that αλT = 0. This implies that λ ∈ CσL,n−1(B, γ),
but dSR(C
σ
L,n−1(B, γ)) = 2, which is a contradiction. Thus
α
(i)
1 , α
(i)
2 , . . . , α
(i)
ni are linearly independent over Fq, for i =
1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Now by definition, and denoting Dγi−1 = D
σ
γi−1
,
we have that
ℓ∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
α
(i)
j D
l
γi−1(β
(i)
j ) = 0,
for l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 2. Take t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − k − 1.
Applying the automorphism σ−t, we see that
0 =
ℓ∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
σ−t(α
(i)
j )σ
−t(Dlγi−1(β
(i)
j ))
=
ℓ∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
σ−t(α
(i)
j )σ
−t(Nσt (γ
i−1))Dl−t
γi−1
(β
(i)
j )
=
ℓ∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
σ−t(α
(i)
j )N
σ−1
t (σ
−1(γ)i−1)Dl−t
γi−1
(β
(i)
j )
=
ℓ∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(Dσ
−1
σ−1(γ)i−1)
t(α
(i)
j )D
l−t
γi−1
(β
(i)
j ),
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. By considering t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − k − 1
and l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 2, we may consider the number l − t
to run from 0 to k − 1. In conclusion, we have proven that
Cσ
−1
L,n−k(A, σ
−1(γ)) ⊆ CσL,k(B, γ)
⊥,
and by computing dimensions, equality holds. Finally, note
that σ−1(γ) is a primitive element since γ is a primitive
element and σ is a field automorphism.
Observe that the linearly independent sets A reduce in the
Gabidulin case (ℓ = 1) to the single linearly independent set
denoted by {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} in [20, Eq. (24)]. The sets A also
reduce in the Reed-Solomon case (n1 = n2 = . . . = nℓ =
1) to the non-zero column multipliers a′1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
ℓ ∈ F
∗
q (ℓ
linearly independent sets in Fq over Fq) of the dual generalized
Reed-Solomon codes in [23, Th. 1].
B. Optimal Coding Schemes for Coherent Communication
To claim the optimality of coding schemes built from
linearized Reed-Solomon codes, we will extend the upper
bound on the entropy of the secret message from [19, Th. 12]
to the multishot case.
Theorem 5. Let t ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 be integers such that
2t+ρ+µ < n. For given random distributions (not necessarily
uniform), if the coding scheme F : S −→ X is t-error and
ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent communication, and secure
under µ observations, then it holds that
H(S) ≤ n− 2t− ρ− µ,
where entropy is taken with logarithms with base qm.
Proof. Define ρ′ = 2t + ρ. By Theorem 1, F is ρ′-erasure-
correcting. Decompose ρ′ = ρ1 + ρ2 + · · · + ρℓ and µ =
µ1 + µ2 + · · · + µℓ, with ρi, µi ≥ 0 and ρi + µi ≤ ni,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Let Ai ∈ F
(ni−ρi)×ni
q and Bi ∈ Fµi×niq
be the matrices formed by the first ni − ρi and µi rows of
the ni × ni identity matrix, respectively, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
9Define A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ) ∈ F
(n−ρ′)×n
q and B =
diag(B1, B2, . . . , Bℓ) ∈ Fµ×nq . Observe that B is a submatrix
of A, and let D ∈ F(n−ρ
′−µ)×n
q be the matrix formed by those
rows in A that are not in B.
Now let X = F (S), as random variables. Then Items 1 and
3 in Definition 2 allow us to write
H(S) = H(S | XBT )
≤ H(S,XAT | XBT )
= H(S | XAT , XBT ) +H(XAT | XBT )
= H(XAT | XBT )
≤ H(XDT )
≤ n− ρ′ − µ = n− 2t− ρ− µ,
and we are done.
We may now claim the optimality of coding schemes built
from nested pairs of linearized Reed-Solomon codes:
Theorem 6. Fix integers t ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 with
2t+ρ+µ < n, and assume that 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ q−1 and 1 ≤ ni ≤ m,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Let k1 = n−2t−ρ and k2 = µ and define
C1 = C
σ
L,k1
(B, γ) and C2 = C
σ
L,k2
(B, γ) as in Definition 11.
The coset coding scheme in Definition 3, corresponding to
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm and choosing S and X = F (S) with
uniform distributions, is t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for
coherent communication, and is secure under µ observations.
In addition, the entropy of the secret message satisfies that
H(S) = logqm |S| = k1 − k2 = n− 2t− ρ− µ.
Hence the coding scheme is optimal according to Theorem 5.
Proof. This follows by combining Theorem 1, Theorem 3,
Proposition 1 and Theorem 4.
Remark 2. In a similar way to the proof of [19, Th. 10], we
may show that if a coding scheme has secret size achieving
the upper bound in Theorem 5, then it must hold that m ≥ ni,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Thus, the coding schemes in the previous
theorem are defined over the largest possible range for the
packet length m, which is the same as in the 1-shot case.
However, we do not yet know if the condition ℓ < q can be
relaxed. As in the MDS case (n1 = n2 = . . . = nℓ = 1), we
conjecture that ℓ must be O(q) (for fixed m and ni). We leave
this bound as open problem. See also Section VI.
C. Nearly Optimal Coding schemes for Non-coherent Com-
munication
In this subsection, we adapt the lifting construction from
[17, Def. 3] to linearized Reed-Solomon codes. In contrast
with the coherent case, the information rate of such construc-
tion is no longer optimal. However, we will show that it is
close to optimal in reasonable scenarios in practice, as shown
in [17, Sec. IV] (see also [19, Sec. VII]). We will make a few
simplifying assumptions.
First, in practical situations it is desirable to encode sepa-
rately (in different layers) for secrecy and reliability, which can
be done using nested coset coding schemes as in Definition 3
(see [19, Subsec. VII-B]). Since linearized Reed-Solomon
codes give optimal security in view of Theorems 5 and 6,
we will only consider deterministic coding schemes and error
and erasure correction. Moreover, the lifting construction will
only add packet headers that contain no information about the
secret message, hence they do not affect the overall security
performance [19, Subsec. VII-E].
Second, by the fact that only column spaces are of impor-
tance for reliability in the non-coherent case (Theorem 2), we
will consider sum-subspace codes [24, Subsec. II-B]. Since a
codeword can inject up to ni packets in the ith shot, we will
restrict our study to sum-constant-dimension codes, which are
simply subsets of the Cartesian product
P(FMq ,n) = P(F
M1
q , n1)× P(F
M2
q , n2)× · · · × P(F
Mℓ
q , nℓ),
where M = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mℓ), and P(FMiq , ni) is the
family of vector subspaces of FMiq of dimension ni, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. In view of Subsection III-B, we will consider
the following parameters of sum-constant-dimension codes.
Definition 12 (Sum-constant-dimension codes). A sum-
constant-dimension code of type [M,n, logq |C|, d]q is any
subset C ⊆ P(FMq ,n) such that dSS(C) = 2d. We define
its rate as
R =
logq |C|∑ℓ
i=1Mini
.
For integers 0 ≤ N ≤ M , recall that the q-ary Gaussian
coefficients are given by[
M
N
]
q
= |P(FMq , N)| =
N−1∏
j=0
qM − qj
qN − qj
.
Therefore, we have that
|P(FMq ,n)| =
ℓ∏
i=1
[
Mi
ni
]
q
. (8)
The following sum-subspace Singleton bound is a refine-
ment of that in [24, Subsec. VI-B] (in the bound in [24], a
single puncturing removes a whole factor P(FMiq , ni)).
Theorem 7. Let C be a sum-constant-dimension code of type
[M,n, logq |C|, d]q . It holds that
|C| ≤ min
ℓ∏
i=1
[
Mi − δi
Mi − ni
]
q
, (9)
where the minimum is taken over numbers 0 ≤ δi ≤ ni, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, such that δ1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δℓ = d− 1.
Proof. Given U = (U1,U2, . . . ,Uℓ) ∈ P(FMq ,n) and a
hyperplaneW ∈ P(FMiq ,Mi− 1), we define the restricted list
of subspaces U i,W as that obtained from U by substituting Ui
by an (ni− 1)-dimensional subspace of Ui∩W , then mapped
by a vector space isomorphism (depending only on W) to a
subspace of FMi−1q .
Assuming that d > 2, the restricted code Ci,W = {U i,W |
U ∈ C} is a sum-constant-dimension code of type [M−ei,n−
ei, |C|, d
′]q , where d
′ ≥ d− 2 > 0 and ei is the ith vector of
10
the canonical basis. The proof of this claim is exactly as that
of [16, Th. 8] and is left to the reader.
Finally, applying such restriction operations to C, δi times
in the ith block, we obtain a sum-constant-dimension code
C′ of type [M − δ,n − δ, logq |C|, d
′]q , where d
′ > 0 and
δ = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δℓ). The result follows now from (8) and the
fact that
|C| = |C′| ≤ |P(FM−δq ,n− δ)|.
We will not simplify further the minimum in (9), since it
will not be necessary for our purposes in Theorem 8.
We now recall the extension of the lifting procedure from
[17, Def. 3] to the multishot scenario, which was first consid-
ered in [25, Subsec. III-D]. In the rest of the subsection, we
will assume that Mi = ni +m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
Definition 13 (Lifting [25]). We define the lifting map
IΣ : Fnqm −→ P(F
M
q ,n) as follows. For c = (c
(1), c(2),
. . . , c(ℓ)) ∈ Fnqm , where c
(i) ∈ Fniqm , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we
define
IΣ(c) =
(
Col
(
MA(c
(i))
Ini
))ℓ
i=1
.
For a block code C ⊆ Fnqm , we define its lifting as the sum-
constant-dimension code IΣ(C) ⊆ P(FMq ,n).
We now observe that the sum-subspace distance between
lifted codewords coincides with twice the sum-rank distance of
the codewords themselves. This is a straightforward extension
of [17, Prop. 4] and is left to the reader.
Proposition 2. Given c,d ∈ Fnqm and a block code C ⊆ F
n
qm ,
it holds that
dSS(IΣ(c), IΣ(d)) = 2 dSR(c,d),
dSS(IΣ(C)) = 2 dSR(C).
Equipped with all these tools, we may finally claim the near
optimality of lifted linearized Reed-Solomon codes. We follow
the lines of [17, Prop. 5]. For simplicity in the formulas, we
assume that the lengths ni are all equal.
Theorem 8. Assume that n′ = n1 = n2 = . . . = nℓ and
recall that M1 = M2 = . . . = Mℓ = n
′ + m. Assume also
that 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ n′ ≤ m. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n and
define d = n− k + 1.
Denote by R1 the rate of the lifted linearized Reed-Solomon
code IΣ(C
σ
L,k(B, γ)) (Definitions 11 and 13) and by R2,
the maximum rate of a sum-constant-dimension code of type
[M,n, N, d]q , running over all possible N ∈ R. It holds that
R2 −R1
R2
<
ℓ
k
·
2
m log2(q)
.
Proof. Let C be a sum-constant-dimension code of type
[M,n, logq |C|, d]q and with rate R2. Let the notation be as
in Theorem 7 for C and for an arbitrary partition d − 1 =
δ1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δℓ. By [16, Lemma 4], we have that[
Mi − δi
Mi − ni
]
q
=
[
n′ +m− δi
m
]
q
< 4qm(n
′−δi), (10)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Therefore, by Theorem 7, we have that
|C| <
ℓ∏
i=1
(4qm(n
′−δi)) = 4ℓqm(n−d+1) = 4ℓqmk,
since ℓn′ = n, δ1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δℓ = d− 1, and n− d+ 1 = k
by the assumptions and Proposition 2. Thus, it holds that
R2 <
logq(4)ℓ+mk
ℓ(m+ n′)n′
.
On the other hand, we have that
R2 ≥ R1 =
mk
ℓ(m+ n′)n′
.
Hence R2 − R1 < logq(4)/((m + n
′)n′), and we conclude
that
R2 −R1
R2
<
logq(4)
(m+ n′)n′
·
ℓ
k
·
(m+ n′)n′
m
,
from which the desired bound follows easily.
Observe that k/ℓ is the rate of information packets injected
per shot. If we inject at least one packet of information per
shot, then ℓ/k ≤ 1, and the previous upper bound is simply
2/(m log2(q)), which is essentially that in [17, Prop. 5], and
is independent of the number of shots. Moreover, as shown in
the proof of [16, Lemma 4], the factor 4 in the upper bound
(10) on q-ary Gaussian coefficients can be refined to
h(q) =
∞∏
j=1
1
1− q−j
< 4,
which decreases quickly as q increases. Thus if k/ℓ ≥ 1, and
following the previous proof, we may also obtain the bound
R2 −R1
R2
<
logq(h(q))
m
,
which is very small even for moderate values of q and m.
V. A WELCH-BERLEKAMP SUM-RANK DECODING
ALGORITHM FOR LINEARIZED REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section, we show how to adapt Loidreau’s version
[26] of the Welch-Berlekamp decoding algorithm [42] to a
sum-rank decoding algorithm with quadratic complexity over
Fqm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes (Definition 11).
Since working with linearized polynomials in the operators
(6) requires keeping track of both a (the conjugacy class) and
b (basis vectors in that conjugacy class), we give the algorithm
for the skew metric [36, Def. 9] and skew Reed-Solomon codes
[37, Def. 7], where evaluation points need not be partitioned
into classes. Using tools from [36, Sec. 3], we will see in
Subsection V-A that both algorithms can be translated into
each other after O(n) multiplications in Fqm .
We note that a skew-metric decoding algorithm for skew
Reed-Solomon codes was also recently given in [38]. However,
this algorithm has cubic complexity. More importantly, it is
not translated to the sum-rank metric, so it is not applicable
for reliability and security in multishot network coding. In
particular, it does not handle erasures, non-coherent commu-
nication or wire-tapper observations. Finally, observe that the
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step from cubic complexity to quadratic complexity is a bigger
jump than from the state of the art (previous to [38]) to a sum-
rank decoding algorithm of cubic complexity, as a function of
the number of shots ℓ and in operations over F2 (see Table I).
We recall also that the use of skew polynomials was
proposed in [51] for secret sharing. This corresponds to using
skew Reed-Solomon codes [37] as MDS codes for reliability
and security. However, without transforming these codes into
MSRD linearized Reed-Solomon codes [36], such schemes are
not suitable for multishot network coding.
The notation throughout this section is as in Subsec-
tion IV-A.
A. Skew Metrics and Skew Reed-Solomon Codes
Define the skew polynomial ring Fqm [x;σ] as the vector
space over Fqm with basis {xi | i ∈ N} and with product
given by the rules xixj = xi+j and
xa = σ(a)x, (11)
for all a ∈ Fqm and all i, j ∈ N. Define the degree of a
non-zero F =
∑
i∈N Fix
i ∈ Fqm [x;σ], denoted by deg(F ),
as the maximum i ∈ N such that Fi 6= 0. We also define
deg(0) =∞.
This ring was introduced with more generality in [52]. It is
non-commutative and both a left and right Euclidean domain.
We will see that evaluations of linearized polynomials as
in Definition 9 correspond to arithmetic evaluations of skew
polynomials, as defined in [48], [49].
Definition 14 (Evaluation [48], [49]). Given F ∈ Fqm [x;σ],
we define its evaluation in a ∈ Fqm as the unique F (a) ∈ Fqm
such that there exists G ∈ Fqm [x;σ] with
F = G(x− a) + F (a).
Given a subset Ω ⊆ Fqm , we denote by FΩqm the set of
functions f : Ω −→ Fqm . We then define the evaluation map
over Ω as the linear map
EΩ : Fqm [x;σ] −→ FΩqm , (12)
where f = EΩ(F ) ∈ FΩqm is given by f(a) = F (a), for all
a ∈ Ω and for F ∈ Fqm [x;σ]. Again, we write EσΩ when there
can be confusion about σ.
We will need some basic concepts regarding the zero sets
of skew polynomials.
Definition 15 (Zeros of skew polynomials). Given a set A ⊆
Fqm [x;σ], we define its zero set as
Z(A) = {a ∈ Fqm | F (a) = 0, ∀F ∈ A}.
Given a subset Ω ⊆ Fqm , we define its associated ideal as
I(Ω) = {F ∈ Fqm [x;σ] | F (a) = 0, ∀a ∈ Ω}.
Observe that I(Ω) is a left ideal in Fqm [x;σ]. Since
Fqm [x;σ] is a right Euclidean domain, there exists a unique
monic skew polynomial FΩ ∈ I(Ω) of minimal degree among
those in I(Ω), which in turn generates I(Ω) as left ideal. Such
a skew polynomial is called the minimal skew polynomial of
Ω [48], [49]. With this in mind, we may recall the concepts of
P-closed sets, P-independence and P-bases from [53, Sec. 4]
(see also [48]):
Definition 16 (P-bases [48], [53]). Given a subset Ω ⊆ Fqm ,
we define its P-closure as Ω = Z(I(Ω)) = Z(FΩ), and we
say that it is P-closed if Ω = Ω.
We say that a ∈ Fqm is P-independent from Ω ⊆ Fqm if it
does not belong to Ω. A set Ω ⊆ Fqm is called P-independent
if every a ∈ Ω is P-independent from Ω \ {a}.
Given a P-closed set Ω ⊆ Fqm , we say that B ⊆ Ω is a
P-basis of Ω if it is P-independent and Ω = B.
The following two lemmas give simple and useful connec-
tion between P-bases and minimal skew polynomials.
Lemma 2 ([48]). Given a finite set Ω ⊆ Fqm , it holds that
deg(FΩ) ≤ |Ω|,
where equality holds if, and only if, Ω is P-independent.
Lemma 3 ([48], [53]). Given a P-closed set Ω ⊆ Fqm , it
admits a P-basis and any two of them have the same number
of elements, which is
Rk(Ω)
def
= deg(FΩ).
From now on, we will fix a P-closed set Ω ⊆ Fqm with
n = Rk(Ω). We will also denote by Fqm [x;σ]n the vector
space of skew polynomials of degree less than n.
The following lemma, given more generally in [48, Th. 8],
is the main idea behind skew weights and skew Reed-Solomon
codes.
Lemma 4 (Lagrange interpolation [48]). The evaluation
map (12) restricted to Fqm [x;σ]n, that is
EB : Fqm [x;σ]n −→ FBqm ,
is a vector space isomorphism, for any P-basis B of Ω.
The definitions of skew weights [36, Def. 9] and skew Reed-
Solomon codes [37, Def. 7] can now be given as follows:
Definition 17 (Skew weights [36]). Given F ∈ Fqm [x;σ]n
and f = EB(F ) ∈ FBqm , for a P-basis B of Ω, we define their
skew weight over Ω as
wtB(f) = wtΩ(F ) = n− Rk(ZΩ(F )),
where ZΩ(F ) = Z(F ) ∩Ω = Z({F, FΩ}) is the P-closed set
of zeros of F in Ω.
As shown in [36], these functions are indeed weights and
define a corresponding metric, called the skew metric.
Definition 18 (Skew Reed-Solomon codes [37]). For each
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, we define the (k-dimensional) skew Reed-
Solomon code over a P-basis B of Ω as the linear code
CσB,k = E
σ
B(Fqm [x;σ]k) ⊆ F
B
qm .
The exact connection between skew metrics and sum-
rank metrics, and between skew Reed-Solomon codes and
linearized Reed-Solomon codes was given in [36, Sec. 3]. We
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TABLE II
MAXIMUM-DISTANCE EVALUATION CODES USING SKEW AND LINEARIZED POLYNOMIALS
Code Metric Type of polynomials evaluated Evaluation points Lengths Field
Reed-Solomon (RS) [22] Hamming Fq[x; Id] = Fq[x] Pair-wise distinct n = ℓ Fq
Generalized RS [23] Hamming {Fq[Dγi−1 ]}
ℓ
i=1 ≡ Multipliers + Fq[x] Non-zero + pair-wise dist. ℓ ≤ q (n
′ = 1) (Base: Fq)
Skew RS [37] Skew Fqm [x;σ] P-independent n = ℓn′ Fqm
Linearized RS [36] Sum-rank {Fqm [Dγi−1 ]}
ℓ
i=1 Lin. indep. + conjugacy ℓ < q & n
′ ≤ m (Base: Fq)
Skew RS in C(1) Skew in C(1) Fqm [x;σ] ≈ {
∑
j ajx
qj−1 | aj ∈ Fqm} Lin. indep. conjugants n = n′ Fqm
Gabidulin [20] Rank Fqm [D1] = {
∑
j ajx
qj | aj ∈ Fqm} Lin. independent n′ ≤ m (ℓ = 1) (Base: Fq)
summarize it in the next theorem, where the first claim on B
combines [48, Th. 23] and [49, Th. 4.5].
Theorem 9 ([36], [48], [49]). Assume that 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ q− 1 and
1 ≤ ni ≤ m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Fix linearly independent sets
B(i) = {β
(i)
1 , β
(i)
2 , . . . , β
(i)
ni } ⊆ Fqm over Fq, and a primitive
element γ of Fqm . With notation as in Subsection IV-A, define
b
(i)
j = Dγi−1(β
(i)
j )(β
(i)
j )
−1, (13)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , ni and i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Then B = {b
(i)
j | 1 ≤
j ≤ ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ} is a P-basis of Ω = B.
Next, if F =
∑
i∈N Fix
i ∈ Fqm [x;σ] and FDa =∑
i∈N FiD
i
a, for some a ∈ Fqm , then
F (Da(β)β
−1) = FDa(β)β−1,
for all β ∈ F∗qm . Define now the linear map ψB : F
n
qm −→ F
B
qm
by ψB(c
(1), c(2), . . . , c(ℓ)) = f , where
f(b
(i)
j ) = c
(i)
j (β
(i)
j )
−1, (14)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , ni and i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. It holds that
ψB(C
σ
L,k) = C
σ
B,k,
for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n. For c ∈ Fnqm , we also have that
wtB(ψB(c)) = wtSR(c).
What this theorem implies is that sum-rank metrics and
linearized Reed-Solomon codes can be treated as skew metrics
and skew Reed-Solomon codes. We only need to multiply the
received word (a vector in Fnqm ) coordinate-wise by n elements
in Fqm as in (14), and similarly compute the corresponding
P-basis as in (13). This requires O(n) multiplications in
Fqm . Thus, decoding algorithms can be directly translated
from one scenario to the other at the expense of just O(n)
multiplications in Fqm .
Theorem 9 also implies that linearized Reed-Solomon codes
can be seen as generalized skew Reed-Solomon codes [54,
Def. 9] for a special choice of column multipliers.
Table II provides a summary of skew and linearized Reed-
Solomon codes, and how they interpolate the intermediate
cases between Reed-Solomon and Gabidulin codes. In that
table, C(1) stands for the conjugacy class of 1 ∈ Fqm over Fq.
The skew Reed-Solomon codes corresponding to Gabidulin
codes are not given a name or reference in the table, since they
are only considered as a particular example in the literature.
B. Key Equations
In this subsection, we will present the skew polynomial ver-
sion of the key equations in the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm.
Fix a P-closed set Ω ⊆ Fqm , one of its P-bases B = {b1,
b2, . . . , bn} and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where n = |B| = Rk(Ω). We
would like to decode up to
t
def
=
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
skew errors for the skew Reed-Solomon code C = CσB,k ⊆ F
B
qm
(see Definitions 17 and 18). Assume then that f ∈ C, e ∈ FBqm
is such that wtB(e) ≤ t, and r = f + e is the received word.
By Lemma 4, we may instead consider
R = F +G ∈ Fqm [x;σ]n,
where F ∈ Fqm [x;σ]k , G ∈ Fqm [x;σ]n with wtΩ(G) ≤ t,
f = EB(F ) and e = EB(G). Following the original idea of
the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm, we want to find a non-zero
skew polynomial L ∈ Fqm [x;σ] of degree deg(L) ≤ t, such
that
(LR)(bi) = (LF )(bi), (15)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. But since we do not know F (we want
to find F ), we look instead for skew polynomials L,Q ∈
Fqm [x;σ] of degrees deg(L) ≤ t and deg(Q) ≤ t + k − 1,
such that
(LR)(bi) = Q(bi), (16)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. To solve these equations, the first problem
that we encounter is evaluating a product of two skew poly-
nomials. This is solved by considering the product rule [49,
Th. 2.7].
Lemma 5 (Product rule [49]). Given U, V ∈ Fqm [x;σ] and
a ∈ Fqm , let c = V (a). If c = 0, then (UV )(a) = 0, and if
c 6= 0, then
(UV )(a) = U(ac)V (a),
where we use the notation ac = σ(c)c−1a.
Therefore, if ri = R(bi), we need to find L and Q as before,
satisfying Q(bi) = 0 for i such that ri = 0, and
L(brii )ri = Q(bi), (17)
for i such that ri 6= 0. Observe that L(b
ri
i )ri = L
D(ri) by
Theorem 9, for D = Dbi , which is also defined for ri = 0.
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Hence it makes sense to define “L(brii )ri = 0” when ri = 0,
and we may consider (17), for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We start by checking that (15) can be solved (hence (17)
can also be solved). The next two propositions can also be
proven by results from [38] (see Remark 3).
Proposition 3. There exists a non-zero L ∈ Fqm [x;σ] of
degree deg(L) ≤ t satisfying (15), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (recall
that wtΩ(G) = wtΩ(R − F ) ≤ t).
Proof. Define ei = G(bi), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By Lemma 5,
we see that (15) is satisfied if
L(beii ) = 0, (18)
for i such that ei 6= 0. The result [36, Prop. 14] says that there
exists a P-basis A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of Ω such that
wtH(EA(G)) = wtΩ(G) ≤ t,
where wtH denotes Hamming weight. Let di = G(ai), for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and let ∆ = {adii | di 6= 0}. Since |∆| ≤ t,
then deg(F∆) ≤ t by Lemma 2. Thus by choosing L = F∆,
we see that
L(adii ) = 0,
whenever di 6= 0. By Lemma 5, this is equivalent to
(LG)(ai) = 0,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In other words, EA(LG) = 0, which
by Lemma 4 is equivalent to EB(LG) = 0. Now again by
Lemma 5, this means that (18) is satisfied, and we are done.
The second ingredient is checking that by solving (17),
we may recover the message skew polynomial F by a right
Euclidean division.
Proposition 4. Assume that L,Q ∈ Fqm [x;σ] satisfy (17),
with deg(L) ≤ t and deg(Q) ≤ t+ k − 1. Then it holds that
Q = LF.
Proof. First, define ci = (LF − Q)(bi), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Observe that if a ∈ Ω and F (a) = R(a), then (LF −Q)(a) =
0 by hypothesis and Lemma 5. Hence
wtΩ(LF −Q) ≤ wtΩ(F −R) ≤ t.
Therefore applying Proposition 3 to LF and Q instead of F
and R, we see that there exists a non-zero L0 ∈ Fqm [x;σ] of
degree deg(L0) ≤ t satisfying
L0(b
ci
i ) = 0,
for i such that ci 6= 0. Define P = L0(LF − Q). If ci = 0,
then by Lemma 5, we have that P (bi) = 0. Now if ci 6= 0,
then by Lemma 5, we have that
P (bi) = L0(b
ci
i ) = 0.
In other words, EB(P ) = 0, and since deg(P ) < n (here is
where we use that t = ⌊n−k2 ⌋), then P = 0 by Lemma 4. The
result follows since Fqm [x;σ] is an integral domain.
Thus we will be able to efficiently decode if we can solve
(17), since then we may just perform Euclidean division,
whose complexity is of t(t+ k − 1) = O(n2) multiplications
in Fqm . Equations (17) form a system of n linear equations
whose unknowns are the coefficients of L and Q. However,
solving such a system by Gaussian elimination has complexity
O(n3) over Fqm . This is the approach in [38]. In the next
subsection, we see how to reduce it to O(n2).
Remark 3. Propositions 3 and 4 can also be derived by
certain combination of results from [38]. However, the ma-
chinery developed in [38] rewrites skew weights [36, Def. 9]
in terms of least common multiples instead of P-closed sets
and P-independence (Subsec. V-A), being the latter essential to
connect skew weights with sum-rank weights (see Theorem 9).
Thus we have preferred to keep a self-contained proof based
on the machinery in Subsec. V-A.
C. Algorithm with Quadratic Complexity
In this subsection, we follow the steps in [26, Subsec. 5.2] to
solve (17) with overall complexity of O(n2) multiplications in
Fqm . The idea is to construct sequences of skew polynomials
Lj, Qj , L˜j, Q˜j ∈ Fqm [x;σ] such that
Lj(b
ri
i )ri −Qj(bi) = 0
L˜j(b
ri
i )ri − Q˜j(bi) = 0
}
(19)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , j and j = k, k+1, . . . , n, and where deg(Ln),
deg(L˜n) ≤ t and deg(Qn), deg(Q˜n) ≤ t+ k− 1. If we have
constructed the jth skew polynomials, we define
sj = Lj(b
rj+1
j+1 )rj+1 −Qj(bj+1),
s˜j = L˜j(b
rj+1
j+1 )rj+1 − Q˜j(bj+1).
(20)
Next we define
Lj+1 = (x− b
sj
j+1)Lj,
Qj+1 = (x− b
sj
j+1)Qj,
(21)
if sj 6= 0; and we also define Lj+1 = Lj and Qj+1 = Qj , if
sj = 0. We also define
L˜j+1 = sjL˜j − s˜jLj,
Q˜j+1 = sjQ˜j − s˜jQj.
(22)
The important fact is that then the (j + 1)th skew polyno-
mials satisfy (19), as we now show.
Proposition 5. If the jth skew polynomials satisfy (19) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , j, then the (j + 1)th skew polynomials given in
(21) and (22) satisfy (19) for i = 1, 2, . . . , j, j + 1.
Proof. In all cases, if i ≤ j, then the result follows from
Lemma 5, since (19) is satisfied for the jth skew polynomials.
Hence we only need to check the case i = j + 1. It is
straightforward to check it for the skew polynomials given
in (22), since evaluation is a linear map. Hence we only need
to prove it for the skew polynomials given in (21), and only
in the case sj 6= 0. Denote
c = Lj(b
rj+1
j+1 )rj+1,
d = Qj(bj+1).
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Observe that sj = c− d 6= 0. We have that
Lj+1(b
rj+1
j+1 )rj+1 −Qj+1(bj+1)
= (bcj+1 − b
sj
j+1)c− (b
d
j+1 − b
sj
j+1)d
= (bcj+1c− b
d
j+1d)− b
c−d
j+1(c− d) = 0,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 5, and the last
equality follows from the fact that the map λ 7→ F (bλ)λ =
FDb(λ) is additive, for b, λ ∈ Fqm (see Theorem 9).
We now describe the actual steps of the algorithm, following
the same scheme as in [26, Table 1]. First we need to pre-
compute the minimum skew polynomial Fk = F{b1,b2,...,bk}
and the unique Lagrange interpolating skew polynomial G ∈
Fqm [x;σ]k such that G(bi) = ri, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k
(Lemma 4). Both can be computed with quadratic complexity
by Newton interpolation (see Appendix B).
The algorithm is as follows, where the inputs are k ∈ N,
(b1, b2, . . . , bn) ∈ Fnqm and (r1, r2, . . . , rn) ∈ F
n
qm .
1) Initialization and Newton interpolation:
• Compute Fk and G.
• Set Lk = 0 and L˜k = x.
• Set Qk = Fk and Q˜k = G.
2) Alternating step: For each j = k, k + 1, . . . , n− 1, do
• Compute sj and s˜j as in (20).
• Exchange the values Lj ←→ L˜j , Qj ←→ Q˜j and
sj ←→ s˜j .
• Compute Lj+1, Qj+1, L˜j+1 and Q˜j+1 as in (21)
and (22).
3) Euclidean division:
• Set L = L˜n and Q = Q˜n.
• Compute F such that Q = LF by Euclidean
division.
4) Return the coefficients of F : (F0, F1, . . . , Fk−1) ∈ Fkqm .
As observed in [26], one can save memory by assigning
each update of the sequences of skew polynomials to them-
selves.
The degrees of L andQ are upper bounded by t and t+k−1,
respectively. This can be shown exactly as in [26, Subsec. 5.2].
The idea is that we increase the degree at most by 1 for
one of the two sequences in every step. By exchanging both
sequences in each step and taking n− k steps, at the end we
have that
deg(L) ≤ ⌊n−k2 ⌋,
deg(Q) ≤ ⌊n−k2 ⌋+ k − 1.
D. Overall Complexity
There are mainly three basic operations in the arithmetic of
skew and linearized polynomials, namely, multiplications and
additions in Fqm , and applying σj(a) = aq
j
, for a ∈ Fqm and
1 ≤ j < m. Multiplications are more expensive than additions,
but we will count both. We anticipate that, in O notation, the
amounts of multiplications and additions in our algorithm are
roughly the same. We will neglect how many times we apply
σj since, when representing elements in Fqm as vectors over
Fq using a normal basis, applying σj amounts to a cyclic shift
of coordinates.
First, Newton interpolation in k P-independent points re-
quires O(k2) multiplications and O(k2) additions (see Ap-
pendix B). This is then the complexity of Step 1.
Second, evaluating a skew polynomial of degree d by
Horner’s rule (i.e., Euclidean division by x−a) requires O(d)
multiplications and O(d) additions. Hence Step 2 requires
O((n−k)(t+k−1)) multiplications and O((n−k)(t+k−1))
additions since, in each of the n− k iterations of Step 2, we
compute 4 evaluations of skew polynomials of degree at most
t + k − 1 to compute sj and s˜j , plus another O(t + k − 1)
multiplications and O(t+ k − 1) additions to compute Lj+1,
Qj+1, L˜j+1 and Q˜j+1.
Third, Euclidean division of a skew polynomial of degree
t + k − 1 by another one of degree t requires O(t(t + k −
1)) multiplications and O(t(t+ k− 1)) additions. This is the
complexity of Step 3.
Summing all these numbers, we see that the previous
algorithm has complexity ofO(t(t+k−1)+k2) multiplications
and O(t(t + k − 1) + k2) additions in Fqm , which can be
simplified to O(n2) since 2t ≤ n and k ≤ n.
E. Translating the Algorithm into Sum-rank Decoding of Lin-
earized Reed-Solomon Codes
To transform this algorithm into a sum-rank decoding al-
gorithm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes, we proceed as
follows. First we build the P-basis B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} by
(13) from the linearly independent sets B(i) = {β
(i)
1 , β
(i)
2 ,
. . . , β
(i)
ni } ⊆ Fqm over Fq, i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and the primitive
element γ ∈ F∗qm . In other words, we compute
b
(i)
j = σ(β
(i)
j )(β
(i)
j )
−1γi−1, (23)
where b
(i)
j = bl and l = n1 + n2 + · · · + ni−1 + j, for j =
1, 2, . . . , ni and i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Then we map the received
word to the vector (r1, r2, . . . , rn) ∈ Fnqm by the map ψB
in Theorem 9, or equivalently, by (14). In other words, we
compute
r
(i)
j = y
(i)
j (β
(i)
j )
−1, (24)
where r
(i)
j = rl and l = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ ni−1 + j, for j = 1,
2, . . . , ni, and where y
(i) = (y
(i)
1 , y
(i)
2 , . . . , y
(i)
ni ) ∈ F
ni
qm is the
received word in the ith shot, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
These two processes require 3n multiplications in Fqm .
Finally we run the algorithm in Subsection V-C. By The-
orem 9, the coefficients of F coincide with those of FDa ,
for any a ∈ Fqm , and also give the message in Fkqm for the
corresponding linearized Reed-Solomon code.
F. Including Erasures for Coherent Communication
Consider that we have used the linearized Reed-Solomon
code CσL,k(B, γ) ⊆ F
n
qm as in Definition 11, and we receive
y = cAT + e ∈ Fn−ρqm ,
where wtSR(e) ≤ t, A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , An) ∈ F
(n−ρ)×n
q ,
and Ai ∈ F
(ni−ρi)×ni
q , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. First, we may
assume that all Ai have full rank. Next compute
(α
(i)
1 , α
(i)
2 , . . . , α
(i)
ni−ρi) = (β
(i)
1 , β
(i)
2 , . . . , β
(i)
ni
)ATi ∈ F
ni−ρi
qm ,
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where B(i) = {β
(i)
1 , β
(i)
2 , . . . , β
(i)
ni }, and define A
(i) = {α
(i)
1 ,
α
(i)
2 , . . . , α
(i)
ni−ρi}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. It follows that the
sets Ai are linearly independent over Fq. Furthermore, by the
linearity over Fq of the operators in Definition 9, we have that
(Dj
γi−1
(α
(i)
1 ),D
j
γi−1
(α
(i)
2 ), . . . ,D
j
γi−1
(α
(i)
ni−ρi))
= (Dj
γi−1
(β
(i)
1 ),D
j
γi−1
(β
(i)
2 ), . . . ,D
j
γi−1
(β(i)ni ))A
T
i
for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Thus cAT
corresponds to the evaluation codeword in the linearized Reed-
Solomon code CσL,k(A, γ) ⊆ F
n−ρ
qm , where A = (A
(1), A(2),
. . . , A(ℓ)). Moreover, the number of sum-rank errors is at most
t = ⌊n−ρ−k2 ⌋, where n− ρ is the length of the new code.
In conclusion, to recover the message we only need to
compute A to find the new code CσL,k(A, γ), and then run the
algorithm in Subsection V-C. Such a computation is equivalent
to the multiplication of a vector in Fnqm with a matrix in
Fn×(n−ρ)q , thus about O(n(n − ρ)) multiplications of an
element in Fqm with an element in Fq. This complexity can be
further reduced to about O(n(n − ρ)/ℓ) such multiplications
by the block diagonal form of A.
G. Including Wire-tapper Observations for Coherent Commu-
nication
Consider a nested coset coding scheme, as in Definition 3,
using linearized Reed-Solomon codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm . If
k1 = dim(C1) and k2 = dim(C2), we may choose W in
Definition 3 as the vector space generated by the last k1 − k2
rows of the generator matrix of C1 given as in (7).
The encoding is as follows. The message is x2 ∈ F
k1−k2
qm .
We generate uniformly at random x1 ∈ F
k2
qm , and we encode
x = (x1,x2) ∈ F
k1
qm using the generator matrix of C1 in (7)
to obtain the codeword c ∈ Fnqm .
Finally, the numbers of errors t and erasures ρ are con-
strained by 2t+ρ ≤ n−k1, by Theorem 6. Thus, we may apply
the decoding algorithm in Subsection V-C to the larger code
C1 and we recover x = (x1,x2) ∈ F
k1
qm . Thus we recover the
message plus the random keys, which we may simply discard
(as usual for instance in the wire-tap channel of type II [40]
or in secret sharing [41]).
H. The Non-coherent Case
As seen in the previous subsection, the addition of the
random keys for security against a wire-tapper influences the
encoding, but not the decoding. Hence we assume µ = 0 wire-
tapper observations in this subsection.
We now argue as in [55, Sec. 4.4]. Let C ⊆ Fnqm be a
linearized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k. Assume that
we transmit the codeword c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(ℓ)) ∈ C using
the lifting process as in Definition 13. This means that the
receiver obtains the matrices
Yi =
(
MA(c
(i))
Ini
)
ATi + Ei
=
(
MA(c
(i)ATi + e
′
i)
ÂTi
)
=
(
MA(y
(i))
ÂTi
)
,
where Rk(Ei) ≤ ti, and Ai ∈ FNi×niq , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. So
now the receiver knows Â = diag(Â1, Â2, . . . , Âℓ) instead of
A, and we may compute the linearized Reed-Solomon code
C′ = CÂT as in Subsection V-F. We may also assume that
Rk(Yi) = Ni, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and Â also has full rank.
By Theorem 2 and Proposition 2, if 2t + ρ < n − k,
then a minimum sum-injection distance decoder would give
us the message. However, summing in i Equation (4.54) in
[55, Sec. 4.4], we have that
dSI(ColΣ(IΣ(c)),ColΣ(Y ))
= wtSR(y − cÂ
T ) +
ℓ∑
i=1
[ni −Ni]
+,
where y = (y(1),y(2), . . . ,y(ℓ)). Since the sum of [ni−Ni]
+
does not depend on c, we may instead use a minimum sum-
rank distance decoder. Therefore, we have reduced the problem
to finding the message corresponding to c′ = cÂT ∈ C′ =
CÂT that minimizes wtSR(y−c
′), and we can find a solution
using the algorithm in Subsection V-C for C′.
I. Iterative Encoding and Decoding
We now remark that encoding and decoding linearized
Reed-Solomon codes can be done in an iterative manner.
First, by the block-wise structure of the generator matrix (7),
we may send the packets corresponding to the ith shot before
computing those corresponding to the (i+ 1)th shot. Second,
note that Newton interpolation (Appendix B), the computation
of the skew polynomials L and Q, and the translation to sum-
rank decoding as in (23) and (24) are all of iterative nature.
Therefore we may perform Steps 1 and 2 in the algorithm
iteratively, first in i then in j, as we receive the packets y
(i)
j ∈
Fqm .
VI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this work, we have proposed the use of linearized
Reed-Solomon codes for reliability and security in multishot
random linear network coding under a worst-case adversarial
model. We have shown that the corresponding coding schemes
achieve the maximum secret message size in the coherent
case, and close to maximum information rate in the non-
coherent case. Moreover, the encoding and decoding can be
performed iteratively and with overall quadratic complexity.
Their advantage with respect to simply using Gabidulin codes
is that their field size is roughly max{ℓ, q0}
n′ (polynomial
in ℓ), in contrast to qℓn
′
0 (exponential in ℓ), where n
′ is the
number of outgoing links at the source, ℓ is the number of
shots, and q0 is the base field size of the underlying linear
network code. This is translated into a reduction of more than
one degree in ℓ in the encoding and decoding complexity in
number of operations over F2 (Table I).
We now list some open problems for future research:
1) The number of shots is restricted to ℓ < q when
using linearized Reed-Solomon codes. In the Hamming-metric
case (n′ = 1), it is well-known that an MDS code satisfies
ℓ < 2q [56]. Since MSRD codes are MDS, we deduce
that ℓ < 2qm/n′. We conjecture, but leave as an open
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problem, that MSRD codes must satisfy ℓ = O(q) instead
of ℓ = O(qm/n′) = O(qm), for fixed values of m and n′.
2) Faster decoding algorithms exist for Gabidulin codes
[27], [28], corresponding to the case ℓ = 1. We leave as an
open problem finding analogous reductions of the decoding
complexity of linearized Reed-Solomon codes.
3) Although unique decoding works analogously for all
linearized Reed-Solomon codes, list-decoding seems to differ
in the Hamming-metric (n′ = 1) and rank-metric (ℓ = 1)
cases (see [57], [58] and the references therein). This suggests,
but we leave as an open problem, that the list-decoding of
sum-rank codes and linearized Reed-Solomon codes behaves
differently with respect to n′ and ℓ.
4) Both the rank-metric list-decodable codes from [58] and
most maximum rank distance codes when n′ > m are only
linear over Fq, instead of Fqm . We leave as an open problem
the study of the security performance of Fq-linear codes in
multishot network coding, as done in [45].
5) Linearized Reed-Solomon codes require using the same
base field q and packet length m in every shot of the network.
We leave as an open problem the construction of MSRD codes
for different base fields and packet lengths in different shots.
6) It seems natural for future research to study convolutional
sum-rank-metric codes rather than convolutional rank-metric
codes. That is, convolutional codes where we consider an
ℓ-shot sum-rank metric in each block rather than the rank
metric. We conjecture that this should be similar to going from
convolutional codes where each block is simply a field symbol
to classical Hamming-metric convolutional codes.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR SECTION III
In this appendix, we give the proofs of the main results
in Section III. We start with the proof of Theorem 1 in
Subsection III-A.
Proof of Theorem 1. First assume that the scheme is not t-
error and ρ-erasure-correcting. Then there exist integers 0 ≤
ρi ≤ ni and full-rank matrices Ai ∈ F
(ni−ρi)×ni
q , for i =
1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and there exist vectors e1, e2 ∈ F
n−ρ
qm , c1 ∈ XS
and c2 ∈ XT , where S 6= T , such that
c1A
T + e1 = c2A
T + e2,
where ρ = ρ1 + ρ2 + · · · + ρℓ, A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ) ∈
F(n−ρ)×nq , and wtSR(e1),wtSR(e2) ≤ t. By defining c =
c1 − c2, we see that
wtSR(cA
T ) = wtSR(e2 − e1) ≤ 2t.
Take now full-rank matrices Bi ∈ Fρi×niq such that(
Ai
Bi
)
∈ Fni×niq is invertible, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. If
B = diag(B1, B2, . . . , Bℓ) ∈ Fρ×nq and
D = diag
((
A1
B1
)
,
(
A2
B2
)
, . . . ,
(
Aℓ
Bℓ
))
∈ Fn×nq ,
then D is invertible and we conclude that
dSR(c1, c2) = wtSR(c) = wtSR(cD
T ) ≤
wtSR(cA
T ) + wtSR(cB
T ) ≤ 2t+ ρ,
thus 2t+ ρ ≥ dSR(Supp(F )).
Assume now that 2t+ρ ≥ dSR(Supp(F )). Take c = c1−c2
such that c1 ∈ XS , c2 ∈ XT , S 6= T , and wtSR(c) ≤ 2t+ ρ.
There exist full-rank matrices Bi ∈ F
(2ti+ρi)×ni
q and vectors
xi ∈ F
2ti+ρi
qm such that c
(i) = xiBi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, where
t = t1 + t2 + · · ·+ tℓ and ρ = ρ1 + ρ2 + · · ·+ ρℓ.
Now let yi ∈ F
2ti
qm be the first 2ti components of xi ∈
F2ti+ρiqm , and let Ai ∈ F
(ni−ρi)×ni
q be a parity-check matrix
of the Fq-linear vector space generated by the last ρi rows in
Bi ∈ F
(2ti+ρi)×ni
q , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Thus, it holds that
c(i)ATi = xiBiA
T
i = (yi,0)BiA
T
i ,
where Rk(MA(yi,0)BiA
T
i ) ≤ Rk(MA(yi)) ≤ 2ti, for i =
1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and we conclude that wtSR(cA
T ) ≤ 2t, where
A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ). Hence there exists e1, e2 ∈ F
n−ρ
qm
with wtSR(e1), wtSR(e1) ≤ t, such that c1A
T+e1 = c2A
T+
e2. Therefore the codewords c1 and c2 correspond to distinct
secret messages, but cannot be distinguished by any decoder.
Thus the scheme is not t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting.
We now prove Theorem 2 in Subsection III-B. We will make
repeated use of the following lemma, which is a particular case
of [18, Lemma 15].
Lemma 6 ([18]). For matrices X,Y ∈ Fm×nq , and integers
ρ ≥ 0 and N ≥ n− ρ > 0, it holds that
min{Rk(XAT − Y BT ) |
A,B ∈ FN×nq ,Rk(A),Rk(B) ≥ n− ρ}
=[max{Rk(X),Rk(Y )}
− dim(Col(X) ∩ Col(Y ))− ρ]+,
where a+ = max{0, a}, for a ∈ Z.
Proof of Theorem 2. First assume that the scheme is not
t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting. Then there exist integers
0 ≤ ρi ≤ ni and matrices Ai, Bi ∈ FNi×niq with Rk(Ai),
Rk(Bi) ≥ ni − ρi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and there exist vectors
e1, e2 ∈ FNqm , c1 ∈ XS and c2 ∈ XT , where S 6= T , such that
c1A
T + e1 = c2B
T + e2,
where ρ = ρ1+ρ2+ · · ·+ρℓ, A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ), B =
diag(B1, B2, . . . , Bℓ) ∈ FN×nq , and wtSR(e1), wtSR(e2) ≤
t. We have that
wtSR(c1A
T − c2B
T ) = wtSR(e2 − e1) ≤ 2t.
By Lemma 6, we also have that
wtSR(c1A
T − c2B
T ) ≥
ℓ∑
i=1
[
max{wtR(c
(i)
1 ),wtR(c
(i)
2 )}
− dim(Col(c
(i)
1 ) ∩ Col(c
(i)
2 ))− ρi
]+
≥ dSI(ColΣ(c1),ColΣ(c2))− ρ,
and we conclude that 2t+ ρ ≥ dSI(ColΣ(Supp(F ))).
Assume now that 2t+ρ ≥ dSI(ColΣ(Supp(F ))). Take c1 ∈
XS , c2 ∈ XT , S 6= T , such that dSI(ColΣ(c1),ColΣ(c2)) ≤
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2t + ρ. Define now mi = max{wtR(c
(i)
1 ),wtR(c
(i)
2 )} −
dim(Col(c
(i)
1 ) ∩ Col(c
(i)
2 )), for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and
δ =
[
ℓ∑
i=1
mi − ρ
]+
−
(
ℓ∑
i=1
mi − ρ
)
≥ 0.
Next let 0 ≤ ρi ≤ mi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, be such that ρ =∑ℓ
i=1 ρi + δ, which implies that
ℓ∑
i=1
(mi − ρi) =
[
ℓ∑
i=1
mi − ρ
]+
.
By Lemma 6, there exist matrices Ai, Bi ∈ FNi×niq such that
Rk(Ai), Rk(Bi) ≥ ni − ρi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, and
wtSR(c1A
T − c2B
T ) =
ℓ∑
i=1
(mi − ρi) =
[
ℓ∑
i=1
mi − ρ
]+
= [dSI(ColΣ(c1),ColΣ(c2))− ρ]
+
≤ 2t,
where A = diag(A1, A2, . . . , Aℓ) and B = diag(B1, B2,
. . . , Bℓ). As in the previous proof, the codewords c1 and
c2 correspond to distinct secret messages, but cannot be
distinguished by any decoder. Thus the scheme is not t-error
and ρ-erasure-correcting.
We conclude this appendix with the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define the map f : Fnqm −→ F
µ
qm given
by
f(c) = cBT ,
for c ∈ Fnqm . Observe that f is a linear map over Fqm . For
the random variable X = F (S), it follows that
H(XBT ) = H(f(X)) ≤ logqm |f(C1)|
= dim(f(C1)) = dim(C1)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C1),
where the last equality is the well-known first isomorphism
theorem. On the other hand, we may similarly compute the
conditional entropy as follows. Recall that X is uniform given
S. We have that
H(XBT | S) = H(f(X) | S) = logqm |f(C2)|
= dim(f(C2)) = dim(C2)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C2).
We leave for the reader to prove as an exercise that ker(f) =
V(L⊥) = V
⊥
L
, where L⊥ = (L⊥1 ,L
⊥
2 , . . . ,L
⊥
ℓ ) (use that Bi is
a parity-check matrix of L⊥i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ). Therefore
I(S;XBT ) = H(XBT )−H(XBT | S)
≤ (dim(C1)− dim(V
⊥
L
∩ C1))− (dim(C2)− dim(V
⊥
L
∩ C2))
= (dim(VL)−dim(C
⊥
1 ∩VL))− (dim(VL)−dim(C
⊥
2 ∩VL))
= dim(C⊥2 ∩ VL)− dim(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL),
where the first equality follows from the dimensions formulas
for duals, sums and intersections of vector spaces.
Finally, if S is uniform in S, then all inequalities in this
proof are equalities.
APPENDIX B
NEWTON INTERPOLATION FOR SKEW POLYNOMIALS
In this appendix, we show how to find the skew polynomials
Fk and G necessary to initialize the algorithm in Subsection
V-C. We use the idea behind Newton’s interpolation algorithm
for conventional polynomials. Newton interpolation for skew
polynomials was investigated in [51]. An algorithm with
quadratic complexity based on Ko¨tter interpolation was given
in [59, Sec. 4]. The algorithm in this appendix is analogous,
but with notation in accordance with the rest of this paper.
Let Bk = {b1, b2, . . . , bk} ⊆ Fqm be a P-independent set
and let a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Fqm . By definition of P-independence,
the sets Bi = {b1, b2, . . . , bi} are also P-independent, for i =
1, 2, . . . , k. It also holds that FBi(bi+1) 6= 0, for i = 1, 2,
. . . , k − 1, by definition.
We have that FB1 = x − b1, and G1 = a1 satisfies that
deg(G1) < 1 and G1(b1) = a1. Now, let 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
and assume that we have computed FBi and Gi such that
deg(Gi) < i and Gi(bj) = aj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , i. Then by
Lemma 5, it holds that
FBi+1 =(x− b
FBi (bi+1)
i+1 )FBi ,
Gi+1 =Gi + (ai+1 −Gi(bi+1))FBi(bi+1)
−1FBi ,
where Gi+1 is the unique skew polynomial with deg(Gi+1) <
i + 1 and Gi+1(bj) = aj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , i + 1. Thus the
required skew polynomials are Fk = FBk and G = Gk.
This algorithm requires computing the evaluations
FBi(bi+1) and Gi(bi+1), where deg(FBi), deg(Gi) ≤ i < k,
which requires O(k) multiplications and O(k) additions. It
requires another O(k) multiplications and O(k) additions in
each of the k − 1 steps. Thus its complexity is of O(k2)
multiplications and O(k2) additions in Fqm .
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